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ACCEPTING THE OMEN: EXTERNAL REFERENCE IN GREEK 
DECLAMATION 
William Guast  
University of Bristol, UK* 
 
Abstract: Traditional accounts of Greek declamation paint this important imperial genre 
as a flight from the alleged impotence of Greek cities under Roman rule into a nostalgic 
fantasy of the autonomy of the Classical past. But there is clear evidence of declaimers 
using their works to refer to the world outside the fiction, often to the immediate 
performance context, and above all to themselves. This paper examines examples from 
Aelius Aristides, Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists, and Polemo, and shows that such a 
practice facilitated vigorous and eloquent communication, while also allowing for any 
external message to be plausibly denied. 
 
Introduction 
Λολλιανὸς δὲ ὁ Ἐφέσιος προὔστη μὲν τοῦ Ἀθήνησι θρόνου πρῶτος, προὔστη δὲ 
καὶ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου στρατηγήσας αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν ὅπλων, ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ αὕτη 
πάλαι μὲν κατέλεγέ τε καὶ ἐξῆγεν ἐς τὰ πολέμια, νυνὶ δὲ τροφῶν ἐπιμελεῖται καὶ 
σίτου ἀγορᾶς. θορύβου δὲ καθεστηκότος παρὰ τὰ ἀρτοπώλια καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων 
βάλλειν αὐτὸν ὡρμηκότων Παγκράτης ὁ κύων ὁ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐν Ἰσθμῷ 
φιλοσοφήσας παρελθὼν ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ εἰπὼν ‘Λολλιανὸς οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἀρτοπώλης, ἀλλὰ λογοπώλης’ διέχεεν οὕτω τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὡς μεθεῖναι τοὺς 
λίθους διὰ χειρὸς αὐτοῖς ὄντας. Σίτου δὲ ἐκ Θετταλίας ἐσπεπλευκότος καὶ 
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χρημάτων δημοσίᾳ οὐκ ὄντων ἐπέτρεψεν ὁ Λολλιανὸς ἔρανον τοῖς αὐτοῦ 
γνωρίμοις, καὶ χρήματα συχνὰ ἠθροίσθη…  
κατηγορῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ Λεπτίνου διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐφοίτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐκ 
τοῦ Πόντου σῖτος, ὧδε ἤκμασεν· ‘κέκλεισται τὸ στόμα τοῦ Πόντου νόμῳ καὶ τὰς 
Ἀθηναίων τροφὰς ὀλίγαι κωλύουσι συλλαβαί, καὶ ταὐτὸν δύναται Λύσανδρος 
ναυμαχῶν καὶ Λεπτίνης νομομαχῶν’. (Philostr. VS 526, 527) 
‘Lollianus of Ephesus was the first holder of the chair of rhetoric at Athens, and he 
also led the Athenian people as Hoplite General. Formerly this office involved 
holding the levy and leading the Athenians out to war, but these days it is concerned 
with the food supply and the grain market. When there was an uproar in the 
bakeries, and the Athenians were starting to stone Lollianus, Pancrates the Cynic, 
who after these events pursued philosophy at the Isthmus of Corinth, came before 
the Athenians and said “It is words, not bread, that Lollianus sells”, and in this way 
so diverted the Athenians that they let go of the stones that were in their hands. And 
when a shipment of grain had arrived from Thessaly and there was no money in the 
treasury to pay for it, Lollianus told his students to make contributions, and a great 
deal of money was collected…  
When Lollianus was condemning Leptines for the law he had brought, since the 
Athenians had stopped receiving grain from Pontus, the climax of his speech was 
as follows: “The mouth of the Pontus has been barred by a law, and Athens’ food 
supply is being held back by a few syllables, and Leptines with his laws is as 
powerful as Lysander was with his ships.”’ 
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Did Lollianus use his speech condemning Leptines to talk about himself and his own 
position in Athens? That speech, of course, was a rhetorical exercise, specifically a 
declamation, a fictitious speech.1 This declamation was set in the fourth century BC, and 
was inspired by Demosthenes’ Contra Leptinem. It is imagined that Leptines’ bill, in 
which it was proposed to abolish all exemptions from liturgies, has been ratified, and that 
                                                 
* E-mail: william.guast@bristol.ac.uk  
I cite Hermog. Stat. according to the edition of Patillon (2009) and Aps. Rh. according to 
the edition of Spengel and Hammer (1884). RG refers to Walz (1832). All translations are 
my own unless otherwise noted.  
For helpful feedback of all kinds, which has improved this article immeasurably, I wish 
to thank Prof. Tim Whitmarsh, Prof. Chris Pelling, Prof. Jaś Elsner, audiences at Radboud 
University, Nijmegen (particularly my respondent on that occasion, Prof. Bé Breij), 
the Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa (particularly Prof. Glenn Most), and Corpus Christi 
College, University of Oxford, and the two anonymous CCJ readers. This article was 
begun when I held a Stavros Niarchos Foundation graduate scholarship at the University 
of Oxford, and finished when I held a fellowship funded by the A.G. Leventis Foundation 
at the University of Bristol’s Institute for Greece, Rome, and the Classical Tradition: I 
wish to place on record my deep gratitude to all three organizations, without whom this 
research would not have been possible. 
1 On Greek declamation generally, see Russell (1983). Other accounts of the genre are to 
be found in Reardon (1971) 104–14, Bowie (1970) 4–10, Kennedy (1974), Anderson 
(1993) 55–64, Swain (1996) 90–6, Schmitz (1997) 10–15, 112–27, 198–205, and 
Korenjak (2000). 
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Leucon of Bosporus, who had previously enjoyed such an exemption, has retaliated by 
stopping shipments of grain to Athens, as Demosthenes had warned might happen (Dem. 
20.29–40).2 Given that Lollianus as hoplite general at Athens had faced at least one bread 
riot, and on another occasion had to raise money from his own students when there was 
no public money to pay for a shipment of grain from Thessaly, it is tempting to see in this 
grain crisis faced by classical Athens a reflection of Lollianus’ own position. Yet while 
several scholars have noticed the coincidence between Lollianus’ real-world occupation 
and his artistic output, they have generally remained cautious about seeing any intentional 
link between the two. Russell says (of this instance and of the possibility of the 
phenomenon in general) ‘in default of clearer evidence, we should be sceptical’;3 
Anderson follows Russell in saying that ‘Lollianus does not actually seem to have used 
his rhetoric against Leptines in front of the real mob’;4 the commentaries of Rothe and 
Civiletti say simply that such a declamatory scenario might have been of particular 
interest to a man who was concerned with Athens’ grain supply.5 Only Pernot comes out 
in favour of a deliberate link.6 
That there is a notable alignment here between life and art is not disputed. What 
is harder to decide, however, is whether (in the absence of a definitive statement by 
                                                 
2 On this declamation scenario, see Kohl (1915) 67, Rothe 48–50, and Civiletti (2002) 
471.  
3 Russell (1983) 108–9. 
4 Anderson (1986) 63–4. 
5 Rothe (1989) 49, Civiletti (2002) 471. 
6 Pernot (2007) 222–5. See also n. 49 below. 
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Philostratus) that alignment was likely to have been actually exploited by Lollianus. Yet 
what tips the balance in favour of a contemporary reference is the fact that this is not an 
isolated example. In this paper (which limits itself to second- and third-century Greek 
declamation), I examine five clear instances (clearer indeed than the Lollianus example) 
of declamations being used in this way, and conclude that Greek declamation was 
probably frequently used to make specific reference to the world outside its own fiction, 
often to the immediate performance context, and above all to the author himself.7 Such 
use of declamatory characters to talk about oneself would of course be a natural extension 
of a phenomenon already well-known to scholarship, namely the Greek imperial habit of 
seeing the present in terms of the classical past,8 and in the examples that follow we will 
see several instances in which the personae adopted by a sophist in declamation continue 
and enlarge upon those he used outside of declamation also.  
                                                 
7 Extant second and third century declamations: Luc. Tyr., Abd., Phal. 1, Phal. 2 (text in 
Macleod (1972), translation in Harmon (1913) and Harmon (1936)); Aristid. Orr. 5–16 
(text in Lenz and Behr (1976), translation in Behr (1981)); two declamations by Polemo 
(text in Stefec (2016), translation and commentary in Reader (1996) (but see Stefec 
(2013) 113–14)); three declamations by Lesbonax (text and commentary in Kiehr 
(1907)); one perhaps by Herodes Atticus (text and commentary in Albini (1968)); one by 
Hadrian of Tyre (text in Hinck (1873)). For the second and third centuries as a (tolerably) 
coherent unit of analysis, see Schmitz (1997) 33–34 and Whitmarsh (2005) 3 n. 1. For 
later Greek declamation and Latin declamation see below at nn. 57-8. 
8 On this phenomenon, see Anderson (1986) 33–36, Desideri (1992), Swain (1996) 65–
100, Schmitz (1998), and Webb (2006). 
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This conclusion matters since to many, Greek declamation, with its painstaking 
recreation of the language and history of Classical Greece, seems, in Russell’s phrase, to 
be ‘pure escapism’ from a world which offered ‘no worthy theatre’.9 To see such external 
references in declamation, then, is to reimagine the genre as not so divorced from the real 
world after all.10 I now examine five instances of declamations being used to speak to the 
world outside their own fiction. 
 
Aelius Aristides 
My first example is confirmed by explicit ancient comment. In the autumn of AD 145, the 
orator Aelius Aristides, who had been suffering from a terrible illness for almost two 
years, was staying at the sanctuary of Asclepius in Pergamum, hoping for a cure. He had 
given up on rhetoric, and referred to this period of his life as a καθέδρα, a ‘time of 
                                                 
9 Quotations from Russell (1983) 109 and Perry (1950) 296 respectively. Compare e.g. 
Marrou (1965) 304 (‘tournait délibérément le dos au réel’), Bowie (1970) 28 (‘flight from 
the present’), Anderson (1993) 101 (‘nostalgic self-awareness’), Bost-Pouderon (2010) 
99 (‘une profonde nostalgie’). Like much Greek imperial literature, many declamations 
were written in an archaising and Atticising Kunstsprache. Schmid (1887) is the 
fundamental work on Atticism: see also Reardon (1971) 81–96, Kennedy (1983) 45–51, 
Anderson (1993) 86–100, Swain (1996) 43–64, Schmitz (1997) 67–96, and Whitmarsh 
(2005) 41–56. For classicism of theme, see the statistics offered by Russell (1983) 107.  
10 For previous work on external reference in Greek declamation, see nn. 49, 57 and 58. 
 
7 
 
 
inactivity’.11 In the fourth of his Hieroi logoi, he narrates some events that had occurred 
at the beginning of his stay in Pergamum. Even though, as he reminds us, his illness had 
forced him to give up rhetoric (Or. 50.14), he was nonetheless commanded by Asclepius 
in a dream to go to the Temple Stoa and declaim (Or. 50.14–15). Accordingly he went to 
the Stoa, where a man called Maximus who chanced to enter at the critical moment 
suggested a scenario. That scenario was ‘When Alexander is in India, Demosthenes 
advises that it is time to act’ (Ἀλεξάνδρου... ἐν Ἰνδοῖς ὄντος συμβουλεύει Δημοσθένης 
ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, Or. 50.18, transl. Behr).12 The proposed rebellion is historical 
fiction, but the known dates of Alexander’s sojourn in India mean that the scenario must 
be set in 327–325. Aristides comments ‘so immediately I accepted the omen, both of 
Demosthenes speaking again and the fact that the words were about hegemony’ (εὐθὺς 
μὲν οὖν ἐδεξάμην τὴν φήμην, τὸν Δημοσθένη τε αὖθις λέγοντα καὶ τοὺς λόγους ὄντας 
περὶ ἡγεμονίας, Or. 50.18). The notion of Demosthenes speaking ‘again’ (αὖθις) seems 
to refer to his relative political inactivity after Alexander’s accession in 336;13 
‘hegemony’ indicates the prospect of Athens recovering its position as a leading Greek 
power. In what sense did Aristides take these two elements of the declamation scenario 
as an omen? As regards ‘speaking again’, the parallel is surely that while both orators had 
                                                 
11 For a reconstruction of this period of Aristides’ life, see Behr (1968) 23–60, 121–22. 
Καθέδρα: Orr. 48.70, 49.44. For this sense of the word, see LSJ s.v. That Aristides had 
rhetorical inactivity in mind specifically is suggested by the choice of a term that could 
also refer to a chair of rhetoric (Behr (1968) 26).  
12 On this scenario, see Kohl (1915) 80–81. It is also found at Syrian. In Hermog. 
II.181.8–11. 
13 For Demosthenes’ inactivity in these years, see Worthington (2000). 
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been undergoing periods of unusual silence, both were about to return to the practice of 
oratory. As for ‘the fact that the words were about hegemony’ (τοὺς λόγους ὄντας περὶ 
ἡγεμονίας), this second part of the omen perhaps finds a parallel in that just as Athens 
had in prospect the recovery of its political leadership of Greece, so Aristides is about to 
begin the process of recovering a metaphorical hegemony in the field of oratory. Aristides 
certainly saw himself as metaphorically ‘first’ among the Greeks (πρῶτος, Orr. 33.32, 
50.87), and political terms were sometimes used to describe a declaimer’s status: the 
declaimer Herodes Atticus was ‘the king of words’ (τὸν βασιλέα τῶν λόγων, Philostr. 
VS 586, 598), while Lucian’s Bad Teacher of Rhetoric holds out the same prospect to his 
prospective student (βασιλεὺς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, Rh. Pr. 11), also advising him to exercise a 
‘tyranny’ over his audiences (τυραννίς, Rh. Pr. 19); the metaphorical use of ‘leadership’ 
to describe pre-eminence in an intellectual sphere is also paralleled in an inscription from 
the 220s in which one Callaeschrus, a devotee of Plato, is described as a σοφίης ἡγήτωρ 
(‘leader in wisdom’).14 This, then, is a clear if unusual example of a declamation (or at 
least a declamation scenario) used to make specific reference to the world outside its own 
fiction. 
 
                                                 
14 For Callaeschrus see Puech (2002) 278-81. This phenomenon is found in the fourth 
century also. The inscription on the statue dedicated to the sophist Prohaeresius at Rome 
reportedly read ‘Rome, the Queen of Cities, to the King of Words’ (Η ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΟΥΣΑ 
ΡΩΜΗ ΤΟΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΟΝΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ, Eunap. VS 492), and Eunapius himself 
uses the image of the tyrant to describe Prohaeresius’ standing (τυραννίς, 490) as well as 
that of Julian of Cappadocia (ἐτυράννει, 492).  
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Interlude: Philostratus as Evidence 
The next three examples are taken from Philostratus’ Vitae sophistarum. As this text 
therefore provides a majority of the five main examples examined in this article, it is 
sensible at this point to consider its value as evidence. One concern we might have is that 
the blurring of art and life seems to be a characteristic interest of Philostratus, seen most 
obviously in his Imagines, where for instance the narrator affects not to know whether a 
bee in the depiction of Narcissus is real or painted (1.23). Is the blurring of declamation 
and life in our examples a further instance of this phenomenon, something that 
Philostratus has added to the raw materials at his disposal? This seems unlikely, for two 
main reasons.  
First, while Philostratus provides the majority of our examples, we have enough 
evidence to suggest that the external references that we observe in the Vitae sophistarum 
were not unique. We have already looked at the case of Aristides’ dream, and our fifth 
and final example will be that of Polemo’s two extant declamations, where external 
reference can be inferred from the text itself. Among the further possible cases with which 
we will finish are two from Aristides; there are also strong candidates on the Latin side, 
and very suggestive cases in later Greek declamation.15 The predominance of 
Philostratean examples of this phenomenon for the second and third centuries makes our 
evidence for this period lop-sided, to be sure, but the existence of examples both before, 
after, and roughly contemporary with the Vitae sophistarum is grounds for confidence in 
Philostratus’ testimony. 
A second reason for confidence comes from an examination of Philostratus’ 
                                                 
15 Cf. below at nn. 57-9. 
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working methods in the Vitae sophistarum. At a general level, the genre of this text, fairly 
characterized by Swain as a cross between pure biography and the blend of biography 
and doxography exemplified by Diogenes Laertius, implies a significant commitment to 
truth.16 Indeed we find Philostratus engaging in a reassuring range of truth-seeking 
practices, such as citing different types of evidence, giving alternative versions, and 
correcting the errors of others: this is clearly a different sort of text from the Vita 
Apollonii, and Swain’s overall judgement is that where data given in Philostratus can be 
independently verified, they are usually found to be correct.17 Philostratus’ personal 
involvement in the world he describes is also important: as Swain says, ‘to distort the 
substance of the information received from his teachers and friends—members of the 
same cultural and economic class—would involve Philostratus in a disrespect of which 
he shows no sign’.18 This pressure would have been particularly strong in the case of the 
declamations of Heliodorus and Hippodromus discussed below. Both sophists were more 
or less contemporary with Philostratus. Philostratus actually witnessed Heliodorus’ 
declamation in person.19 Meanwhile, his source for Hippodromus’ declamation, 
                                                 
16 Swain (1991) 151. I am indebted throughout this paragraph to Swain’s article. For a 
narratological view of Philostratus, see Whitmarsh (2004) 435–39. 
17 Swain (1991) 158–59. 
18 Swain (1991) 152–53. 
19 Philostratus witnessed Heliodorus’ appearance before Caracalla in 213 (VS 625–6, esp. 
ἡμῖν ‘to us’ in 626), and this sophist was still alive when Philostratus was writing (VS 
627); Hippodromus’ dates are roughly 156–230. For the biography of both figures, see 
Janiszewski et al. (2015) 159, 176. 
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performed before Megistias, seems to have been Megistias himself (VS 618); furthermore, 
Hippodromus had taught Philostratus’ son-in-law (VS 617), and on one occasion in his 
narrative of Hippodromus’ life, Philostratus slides into presenting himself as a first-
person witness;20 he had also probably met Hippodromus’ kinsman Philiscus at the court 
of Julia Domna (VS 622). While Philostratus’ connection to the rather earlier Herodes 
Atticus was obviously more distant, he says that his account offers new material that he 
gathered from personal contacts: any substantive distortion of what he had been told 
might have run the risk of offending his informant.21 Finally, where declamations had 
been written down, and had survived until Philostratus wrote the Vitae sophistarum 
(something more likely in the case of the near-contemporary work of Hippodromus and 
Heliodorus), titles and quotations could be checked: Philostratus tells us that there were 
‘about thirty’ (τριάκοντα ἴσως) declamations of Hippodromus still extant in his time 
(VS 620), and a phrase from a declamation of Herodes, one of my examples below, is 
described by Philostratus as ‘that oft-repeated line’ (τὸ θρυλούμενον ἐκεῖνο, VS 574).22 
So genre, social ties, and the possibility of cross-checking together make it unlikely that 
                                                 
20 ‘we expected to hear a speech…’ (ᾠόμεθα λόγου ἀκροάσεσθαι, VS 617). 
21 New material: ‘part of it unknown’ (τὰ δὲ ἠγνοημένα, VS 566). Personal contacts: 
Ctesidemus the Athenian (VS 522) and ‘my own teachers’ (τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ διδασκάλων, VS 
585). 
22 For the writing down of declamations and other performances of rhetors, even relatively 
ad hoc performances, see Heath (2004) 255–76. Other instances in Philostratus of 
declamations preserved in writing: VS 512, 539, 579, 612, 621, and perhaps 599. Some 
of Dionysius of Miletus’ students knew his declamations by heart (VS 523–4). 
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Philostratus could have engaged in much finessing of the declamations he mentions in 
the direction of external references. It is further reassuring that in one case that we can 
independently verify, Aristides’ declamations on the Sicilian expedition (Orr. 5–6), 
Philostratus reports the scenario correctly (VS 584), and that for another declamation, 
performed by Aristides before Marcus, Philostratus actually refuses to give the title 
because of the proliferation of variants (VS 583): this is not the action of a man who is 
cavalier about declamation titles.23 
It seems likely, then, that just as Philostratus’ picture of a marked flourishing of 
declamatory culture in the second and third centuries was ultimately vindicated by 
epigraphic and numismatic evidence, despite relatively sparse attestation elsewhere in the 
literary record, and despite the doubts of Brunt, so too is the evidence he provides of 
external references in declamation essentially sound.24 
 
Heliodorus 
My second example involves the sophist Heliodorus. After his colleague on an embassy 
to the emperor Caracalla had fallen ill, he tried to postpone his suit, and an official had to 
bring him into court ‘against his will, dragging him by the beard’ (ἄκοντά τε καὶ τοῦ 
                                                 
23 This reticence is notable given Philostratus’ practice elsewhere of reporting variant 
traditions without expressing a preference (e.g. VS 559, 585): perhaps he feared offending 
one of his informants if he came out against their version on this occasion (though ancient 
historians often record variants without judgement in this way). 
24 Doubts: Brunt (1994). Epigraphic and numismatic evidence: Schmitz (1997) 14–17 and 
Puech (2002). 
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γενείου ἕλκων, VS 626); his opening words to the emperor were a plea that he not harm 
his case by pleading alone. The emperor then unexpectedly called Heliodorus ‘such a man 
as I have not yet encountered, a discovery of my own times’ (οἷον οὔπω ἔγνωκα, τῶν 
ἐμαυτοῦ καιρῶν εὕρημα), and shook his cloak at him (VS 626). At first, Philostratus says, 
Heliodorus thought that the emperor was mocking him (διαπτύοι, VS 626), but in reality, 
this was a rather cryptic (maybe deliberately cryptic) expression of approval, and 
Caracalla went on to grant Heliodorus equestrian status. Reassured by this happy turn of 
events, the sophist was then bold enough to invite the emperor to hear him declaim. 
Possibly he was too bold, and missed the latent menace of the emperor’s odd behaviour, 
for the emperor replied that Helidorous should declaim immediately, and proposed the 
scenario ‘Demosthenes on trial for cowardice after he had broken down in a speech before 
Philip’ (ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐπὶ τοῦ Φιλίππου ἐκπεσὼν καὶ δειλίας φεύγων, VS 626).25 This 
title refers to an incident in 346 BC, when, according to Aeschines, Demosthenes broke 
down while addressing Philip on an embassy at Pella.26 This scenario clearly figures the 
context in which the declamation is performed: the ambassador Heliodorus, who tried 
repeatedly to postpone his appearance before the emperor, has been figured as the orator 
Demosthenes accused of cowardice on his embassy, and Caracalla is using the 
                                                 
25 Such a change of temper on the part of the emperor is quite consistent with Philostratus’ 
image of Caracalla elsewhere: see Civiletti (2002) 202, 653. 
26 Aeschin. 2.34–5 and 114. This scenario is also found in the scholia to Hermogenes’ De 
statibus (RG 7.442.1–2). Cf. Kohl (1915) 68. 
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declamation to ridicule the sophist.27 
 
Hippodromus 
My third example is Hippodromus’ declamation on ‘the magician who had resolved to 
die when he had been unable to kill another magician who had committed adultery’ (τὸν 
μάγον τὸν ἀποθνήσκειν ἀξιοῦντα ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐδυνήθη ἀποκτεῖναι μάγον μοιχόν, VS 619).28 
This scenario is seen by Rothe as yet another example of ‘die völlig unrealistischen, sogar 
absurden Rechtsfälle, über die in der Kaiserzeit deklamiert wurde’.29 And at first glance, 
to be sure, the interest in such a scenario would appear to be purely artistic: a chance for 
a dramatic prosangelia (an imaginary sort of case in which a man denounced himself and 
sought permission to die), for parallelism and contrast between the two magicians, and 
for the paradox of the magician who couldn’t do magic.30 Yet for this declamation, 
Philostratus’ unusually full account of the context in which it was performed (VS 618–
19) reveals once more a close connection between declamation and life. 
                                                 
27 Anderson (1986) 53 calls the choice ‘“appropriate”’, though he also refers to it as an 
‘irrelevant re-enaction of history’. It is just possible that Caracalla is also provocatively 
figuring himself as the terrifying Philip here, for it was not unknown for emperors to be 
figured as such (Aristid. Or. 32.29, Philostr. VA 7.1–2, 7.37). 
28 A reconstruction of the full background to the scenario is attempted by Rothe (1989) 
241. 
29 Rothe (1989) 241. 
30 For prosangeliai see Russell (1983) 35–7. 
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On arriving in Smyrna for the first time, Hippodromus enters the class of a 
distinguished local sophist (τις... τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, VS 618) without explaining himself. 
Having thus secured the rhetor’s attention, he at first refuses to state his business, waiting 
until he and Megistias are alone,31 and then proposes to declaim himself, even going as 
far as to demand (with obvious symbolism) that Megistias swap his ‘gown suited to public 
speaking’ (δημηγορικὸν ἱμάτιον, VS 619 transl. Wright) for his own traveller’s cloak.32 
This is highly provocative behaviour. Megistias duly proposes ‘the magician who had 
resolved to die when he had been unable to kill another magician who had committed 
adultery’ (VS 619). 
Now this scenario, however fantastical, has clear parallels with Hippodromus’ 
meeting with Megistias. In both the real world and the proposed fiction, we have two 
pairs of professionals, rhetoricians and magicians: the figuring of rhetoricians in terms of 
magicians is natural when we recall the traditional association between rhetoric and 
                                                 
31 How long he waits depends on how we take διακωδωνίσας (VS 619). If we follow LSJ 
(s.v. III), the verb means ‘dismiss by the sound of a bell’, and Megistias sends his students 
away immediately so as to be able to speak with Hippodromus; other authorities, 
however, take this verb as meaning ‘test, examine’, and believe that Megistias finishes 
his lesson first. Certainty is impossible (for the debate, see Civiletti (2002) 639 and Rothe 
(1989) 239), though for Megistias calmly to finish his teaching before speaking to the 
upstart would represent a deliciously prickly response to the intrusion on his lesson. 
32 For the ἱμάτιον as the garment typically used by sophists for their performances, see 
Civiletti (2002) 639–40. 
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magic.33 In both the real world and the fiction the relative status of the two professionals 
is in question: one magician resists the other’s attempts to kill him, while Hippodromus, 
an unimpressive-looking newcomer in Smyrna (‘rather boorish to look at’, ἀγροικότερος 
τε ὢν τὸ εἶδος, VS 618) seeks to win the respect of an established sophist.34 But Megistias 
is doing more than simply using the present context as inspiration: there is also something 
rather aggressive about the scenario he has suggested. Hippodromus is being asked to 
play the part of the lesser of the two professionals, the magician who couldn’t kill his 
colleague, and who was so distressed by this that he wanted to die; Megistias casts himself 
as the other magician, impervious to his rival’s skills. Moreover, he has skilfully placed 
the upstart in a catch-22 situation: either he tries to meet the challenge, but in doing so 
has to play the part of a failed and suicidal professional, or he refuses this demeaning 
suggestion, but thereby fails the challenge. As it turns out, Hippodromus declaims so 
successfully that he wins the admiration of both Megistias and ‘the cultured men in 
Smyrna’ (τῶν κατὰ τὴν Σμύρναν πεπαιδευμένων, VS 619). The one quotation that 
Philostratus gives from the declamation, and the one at which Megistias ‘could not 
contain himself for admiration’ (ἐξέπεσεν ἑαυτοῦ ὑπὸ θαύματος, VS 619), is ‘but myself 
at least I can [kill]’ (ἀλλ’ ἐμαυτόν γε δύναμαι): perhaps Hippodromus adopted, or aimed 
to adopt, the specific strategy within his declamation of abasing himself to such an extent 
                                                 
33 For the connection between rhetoric and magic in Gorgias, Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, 
and the Second Sophistic, see de Romilly (1975); for sophists’ interest in magic, see 
Civiletti (2002) 588. 
34 There may be a further pun involved in figuring Meg-istias as μάγος (‘mag-ician’). For 
the sophists’ fondness for nicknames, see Heath (2004) 40–1. 
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that Megistias felt compelled to yield.35 The scenario ‘the magician who had resolved to 
die when he had been unable to kill another magician who had committed adultery’, then, 
turns out to figure the circumstance in which it was suggested, and becomes a 
sophisticated vehicle for the contestation of status between sophists. 
 
Alexander Clay-Plato 
My fourth example is Alexander’s Scythian declamation (VS 571–4). Alexander is one of 
the sophists about whose career Philostratus gives us a relatively large amount of 
information. One of the leitmotifs of that career in Philostratus is travel. We hear that he 
practised in Antioch, Rome, Tarsus and – ‘by Zeus’ (νὴ Δία) – the whole of Egypt, where 
he met the mysterious naked philosophers (VS 571).36 When he delivered his declamation 
on the Scythians he was making what Philostratus explicitly describes as one of his few 
visits to Athens, that centre of sophistic activity. Even this visit, however, was a mere 
stop on the way to Pannonia, and the journey from the East (perhaps from his home in 
                                                 
35 Such a strategy would fit with Philostratus’ account of Hippodromus’ modesty and 
decorous behaviour towards his seniors (VS 616–17). Philostratus’ phrasing (‘having 
begun the scenario and having said’, ἀρξαμένου δὲ τῆς ὑποθέσεως καὶ εἰπόντος) leaves 
it unclear whether these were the opening words of Hippodromus’ attempt at the 
declamation. For scholars’ differing opinions and translations, see Civiletti (2002) 641. 
36 One ‘Alexander the Rhetor’ (Ἀλέξανδρος ῥήτωρ) turns up on a statue base of the 
second or third century from Memphis, dedicating the statue ‘to the most fertile Nile’ 
(Νίλωι γονιμωτάτωι). See Puech (2002) 46–47. This is tantalizing, but as Puech rightly 
says, ‘la banalité du nom interdit toute tentative d’identification’. 
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Seleucia) is explicitly described as a long one. Its length is also foregrounded by the tragic 
idiom Alexander uses to announce his stay in Athens, ‘Here let us bend the knee in rest’ 
(ἐνταῦθα … γόνυ κάμψωμεν, VS 571; cf. PV 32 οὐ κάμπτων γόνυ of not being able to 
rest); his preliminary remarks too include (along with an encomium of Athens) an apology 
for not having visited the city sooner. Even Herodes gets in the mood by arriving in an 
Arcadian hat, which Philostratus interprets as a sign that he too had just arrived from a 
journey. It is hardly surprising, then, that the scenario proposed concerns travel: ‘A man 
encourages the Scythians to return to their former itinerant lifestyle after they fall ill living 
in cities’ (ὁ τοὺς Σκύθας ἐπανάγων ἐς τὴν προτέραν πλάνην, ἐπειδὴ πόλιν οἰκοῦντες 
νοσοῦσι, VS 572).37 Given that this title puts Alexander in a position to praise the 
wandering lifestyle, it looks like a friendly invitation for Alexander to valorize his own 
                                                 
37 On this scenario, see Kohl (1915) 14–15; it also appears at Aps. Rh. 228.10–11, 230.6, 
233.17–18, 247.17–19, and 253.3–4; Hippodromus also performed a scenario referred to 
by Philostratus as ‘the Scythians’ (οἱ Σκύθαι, VS 620). Quite a number of Alexander’s 
known declamations in fact seem to have some connection with travel. Besides his 
declamation advising those who live in the mountains to migrate to the plains, presumably 
similar to his Scythian declamation (VS 575), Philostratus also reports another scenario 
in which he spoke in favour of Darius bridging the Danube, and a third in which he sought 
to dissuade Xerxes from making a second expedition against Greece (VS 575), though 
this last puts the speaker in the position of arguing against migration; among the unplaced 
quotations from his oratory, too, it is notable that one is flowery praise of the land of 
Arabia (VS 574). 
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mode of life.38 If, as Alexander says in the course of his declamation, waters that keep on 
the move are sweeter (VS 573), so too is Alexander the better for his wandering lifestyle; 
one of the quotations from the declamation reveals that the fictitious speaker was a 
Scythian himself (VS 573), making self-reference easier still. The scenario chosen for 
Herodes’ response (‘The wounded in Sicily beg the departing Athenians to kill them with 
their own hands’ (οἱ ἐν Σικελίᾳ τρωθέντες… αἰτοῦντες τοὺς ἀπανισταμένους ἐκεῖθεν 
Ἀθηναίους τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἀποθνήσκειν, VS 574) also seems to have relevance to the 
context, particularly the ‘oft-repeated line’ mentioned by Philostratus, ‘Ah, Nicias, ah, 
father, so may you see Athens’ (ναὶ Νικία, ναὶ πάτερ, οὕτως Ἀθήνας ἴδοις): such words 
could easily have been addressed to the man who had only now, at long last, fulfilled the 
expectations of the Athenians and visited their city, and indeed it is notable that Alexander 
is said to have spoken up at this point, which seems to have been the end and therefore 
perhaps the climax of the declamation. Once again, declamation proves to be a 
sophisticated vehicle for social interaction among sophists, albeit less aggressively than 
in the case of Hippodromus and Megistias. 
 
Polemo 
The examples so far have all been excerpts mentioned in passing, but our analysis need 
not be confined to fragments. For external reference also occurs, I believe, in the surviving 
                                                 
38 To figure oneself as a Scythian was of course far from unparalleled: Lucian sees a 
reflection of his itinerant career in stories about Scythians (Scyth.), and there is also 
something more than a little Lucianic in the Scythian’s probing questions about Greek 
culture in Anach. and Tox. 
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pair of Marathonian declamations by the famous declaimer Polemo. The scenario for this 
pair of speeches is as follows. It is imagined that there is a custom that, after a battle, the 
funeral oration over the dead is given by the father of the best fighter from among those 
who died. In these declamations, the fathers of two Greek casualties at Marathon make 
the case for their sons, Cynegirus and Callimachus, of whom the latter was leader of the 
Athenian army (polemarch). Cynegirus had died when his hands were cut off as he clung 
to a retreating Persian ship; Callimachus had been killed by enemy projectiles, though his 
body had somehow remained upright, even in death. 
It is my contention that the fates of these two fighters evoked the sufferings of 
Polemo himself, who fought and lost a lengthy battle against a wasting disease of the 
joints.39 Such a self-identification is bold, to be sure, but hardly beyond the arrogant 
Polemo;40 furthermore, the use of illness and in particular, spectacular illness, as part of 
                                                 
39 Compare den Dulk and Langford (2014) 221 n. 46, who say suggestively with reference 
to Polemo’s suicide that ‘[n]oble death was also a topic on which Polemo gave public 
discourses’. Reader (1996) 39–40 considers the stress on the severed hands and upright 
corpse in Polemo’s version of this familiar narrative to be uniquely Polemonian: a 
deliberate shaping of the story on Polemo’s part to bring it closer to his own sufferings 
could explain this observation. On Polemo’s self-presentation generally, see Gleason 
(1995) 21–54, esp. 21–9. 
40 Polemo was reportedly ‘so arrogant that he talked down to cities, talked to rulers 
without any hint of inferiority, and talked to gods from a position of equality’ 
(ὑπέρφρων… οὕτω… ὡς πόλεσι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ προὔχοντος, δυνασταῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ 
ὑφειμένου, θεοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου διαλέγεσθαι, VS 535), and when putting up a statue of 
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one’s public identity was of course a strategy also used extensively by another, slightly 
later declaimer, Aristides, and, in a later century, Libanius.41 ‘With his joints hardening’ 
(λιθιώντων αὐτῷ τῶν ἄρθων), Polemo famously wrote to Herodes Atticus that, albeit 
metaphorically, ‘I have no hands’ (χεῖρας οὐκ ἔχω, VS 543), just as Cynegirus lost his 
hands. And just as Callimachus in these declamations is imagined as struggling to stay 
standing (B3, 11, 12, 14, 15, 38, 47, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60), so standing too must have 
been difficult for Polemo: in the same letter to Herodes, he said ‘I have no feet’ (πόδες 
οὐκ εἰσί μοι, VS 543), and there is a memory in Philostratus that he had to be carried in a 
litter to his performances (VS 537); presumably his habit of standing for the high points 
of his speeches (VS 537), and therefore remaining seated for the majority of the time, is 
to be traced to foot trouble also, for the usual procedure was to deliver the prolalia seated 
                                                 
Demosthenes, gave patronymic and demotic for the greatest orator Greece had ever 
known, but referred to himself simply as Polemo, as if he were the more famous of the 
two (Puech (2002) 399–400). 
41 See Anderson (1986) 30–31 for sophists’ ‘bizarre privations’. Aristides’ sufferings are 
narrated in his Hieroi logoi (Orr. 47–52): on these, see Petsalis-Diomidis (2010), 
Israelowich (2012), and Downie (2013). For Libanius, see Leppin (2011) 428. For 
conquering physical pain as an (alternative) strategy of self-presentation in this period, 
see Francis (1995). One final point of contact between Polemo and Callimachus was that 
the former was also – in name at least – a general, holding the office of stratēgos, 
Smyrna’s senior magistracy (Amandry and Burnett (2015) no. 1972). For the generalship 
at Smyrna, see Cadoux (1938) 194. 
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but to stand throughout the declamation itself.42  
Both the sophist and his subjects show similar attitudes to their physical 
sufferings. Polemo urged his doctors when treating him to ‘dig and carve in the stone-
quarries of Polemo’ (ὀρύττειν καὶ τέμνειν τὰς Πολέμωνος λιθοτομίας, VS 543 transl. 
Wright),43 while Callimachus taunts the Persians, saying ‘Pelt me; do not hold back. Why 
are you not pelting me? I demand missiles’ (βάλλετε καὶ μὴ φείδεσθε. τί δ’ οὐ βάλλετε; 
ἐγὼ δέομαι βελῶν, B56). Both the sophist and his subjects also showed extraordinary 
obstinacy. Polemo famously thought of declaiming even as he was being buried alive 
(‘give me a body and I will declaim’, δότε μοι σῶμα καὶ μελετήσομαι, VS 544), just as 
Callimachus even when pierced through with arrows went on ‘fighting without a soul’ 
(χωρὶς ψυχῆς μεμαχημένον), a ‘corpse stronger than death’ (νεκρὸν θανάτου κρείττονα, 
                                                 
42 Connolly (2001) 85 notes the pain that standing in performance must have caused 
Polemo. Philostratus also, however, in the same chapter refers to Polemo as sometimes 
stamping the ground during his speeches: presumably this habit dates from a time before 
his illness had begun to make standing difficult, or occurred only after Polemo had already 
stood up for a high point, in which case it would likely have been another instance of the 
sophist making a show of overcoming physical limitations (den Dulk (2014) 228). For 
the convention of standing for the declamation itself, see Clarke (1968) and Vössing 
(2003). 
43 Anderson (1986) 70 (supported enthusiastically by Civiletti (2002) 501) suggests 
‘perhaps he saw himself as giving orders to the Athenian prisoners in Syracuse’: if so, it 
would be another instance (albeit brief) of Polemo figuring himself as a character from 
classical history. 
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B2; for the same insistent idea, cf. B1, 11, 12, 15, 47, 50, 52, 53, 55, 60); the same 
resistance to physical necessity can be found in Cynegirus too, who ‘rebuked his nature 
for being feeble, and demanded his hands back from it’ (ὡς ὀλίγῃ κατεμέμφετο τῇ φύσει 
καὶ χεῖρας ἀπῄτει παρ’ αὐτῆς, A11). Polemo and his subjects are also specifically 
concerned not to be seen to fail: ‘Hurry, hurry—may the sun not see me silent’ (ἔπαγε, 
ἔπαγε, μὴ γὰρ ἴδοι με σιωπῶντα ἥλιος), cried Polemo as he was buried (VS 543); 
Callimachus stayed standing as the Persians were sailing away, ‘so that [he] might not 
fall in the presence of any foreign witnesses’ (ὡς ἂν ἐπὶ μηδενὸς μάρτυρος ἀλλοτρίου 
πέσῃς, B14). Obviously Polemo’s death happened after these declamations were 
delivered, but it is plausible to assume that Polemo’s behaviour at his death demonstrated 
traits of character that he had shown throughout his life. 
These speeches contain several striking opportunities to underline the 
identification of Polemo and his subjects in performance.44 Consider for example 
Callimachus’ aristeia, which is so insistently presented in these speeches as a feat not just 
of not falling, but also of standing. Given that, as Philostratus tells us, standing was 
difficult for Polemo, but that he nonetheless did so for the high points of his performances, 
there arises the tantalizing possibility that by bringing himself to stand for the high points 
(of which there are many) of these speeches, Polemo underwent and performed the 
sufferings of Callimachus before the very eyes of his audience. If such an identification 
was made, then a line like Callimachus’ reported last words to himself late in the second 
speech – ‘stand unmoved, Callimachus’ (στῆθι, Καλλίμαχε, ἀκίνητος, B58) – delivered 
                                                 
44 On theatricality in declamation, see Connolly (2001) esp. 85–6. 
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by a barely standing Polemo, could have been positively electric.45 Again, this sort of 
behaviour would not have been unprecedented. For making a show of overcoming 
physical impairments to declaim we could look to the career of Aristides, who proudly 
talks of the panēguris (‘national assembly’, as Behr translates it) that came to his house 
to hear him speak when he was ill (‘contending right from my bed’, αὐτόθεν ἐκ κλίνης 
τοὺς ἀγῶνας ποιουμένῳ, 47.64), and who describes the breathing problems that he had to 
overcome at the start of a performance (50.17); for the idea that the orator’s challenge is 
as great as that of his subjects, we might compare Aristides’ claim in his Panathenaicus 
that the rhetorical challenge of adequately describing the Battle of Salamis is as great as 
the battle itself (Or. 1.152).  
A second opportunity for underlining the identification of sophist and subject in 
performance concerns Cynegirus’ and Polemo’s hands.46 Right at the end of his speech, 
Cynegirus’ father says to the Athenians the words ‘I stretch forth hands to you that are 
like those lying fallen on your behalf’ (χεῖρας ὑμῖν ὁμοίας προτείνω ταῖς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν 
κειμέναις, A49). Now while the point of comparison (ὁμοίας) is explained in what 
follows—Cynegirus’ father puts his hands on his son’s tomb, as his son put his hands on 
a Persian ship—at the moment in the speech at which Cynegirus’ father says these words 
that point of comparison is not yet clear: given that the speaker before their eyes famously 
                                                 
45 In bringing such suffering so graphically before the eyes of his audience, Polemo’s 
performance might also perhaps have had more than a little in common with the spectacle 
of Galen’s gory vivisections, for which see Gleason (2009). 
46 On the attention paid to hands in a rhetorical performance, see [Cic.] Rhet. Her. 
3.15.26–7; Cic. de Orat. 3.220; Quint. Inst. 11.3.84–124. 
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had a wasting sickness of the joints, the audience could have heard χεῖρας ὑμῖν ὁμοίας 
προτείνω ταῖς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κειμέναις as ‘I, [Polemo] stretch out hands to you that are 
similar to those [of Cynegirus] that fell’: similar, that is, in their state of ill health.47 These 
are the moments at which the identification of the two pairs of hands could have been 
most to the fore, but there are others: at A42 Cynegirus is described as ‘giving up someone 
else’s hand, as it were’ (ὥσπερ ἀλλοτρίαν χεῖρα διδούς), in a clever reuse of this 
Isocratean formula; at A39 we hear the suggestive line ‘if we had such hands as you had’ 
(εἰ τοιαύτας χεῖρας εἴχομεν οἵας σύ).48 
 
Further Examples 
How common was such external reference? Given our limited information about the 
context in which a given declamation was performed, the instances that we can discern 
                                                 
47 If Polemo were to have actually stretched out his hands at this moment or others during 
the performance, the double meaning would have been obvious: the deictics in τοῦτο ἦν 
τὸ δόρυ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἡ Κυναιγείρου δεξιά, τοῦτο δᾷδες τῶν θεῶν χεῖρες ἐλευθέριον σέλας 
φέρουσαι (‘this—the right hand of Cynegirus—was the spear of Athena; this—the hands 
that brought the light of freedom—was the fire-brands of the gods’, A36) might have 
offered a particularly appropriate moment for a gesture. If Polemo’s hands appeared 
visibly diseased, so much the better.  
48 The equation is complex by this stage, to be sure (strictly three sets of hands are now 
involved), but the similarities would have been more salient if reinforced visually, and 
would have been easier to spot after more the obvious points of similarity between 
Polemo and his subjects earlier in the speech. 
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today may well be only the tip of the iceberg. I now attempt to glimpse the underside of 
that iceberg, by examining a number of other suggestive alignments between declamation 
and life in the cases of Polemo and Aristides. In view of the clear cases that we have 
examined above, it seems quite likely that some of these alignments were also put to use 
by the declaimers for self-reference.49 
                                                 
49 I find some of the details of the examples in Pernot (2007) problematic. The first two 
examples, both taken from Cassius Dio (59.20.6, 67.12.5), are rhetorical denunciations 
of tyrants (in this instance actually in progymnasmata (preliminary exercises) rather than 
full declamations). These are understood by Caligula in the first instance and Domitian 
in the second as directed at themselves, and are accordingly punished. But the emperors’ 
readings in both cases are taken as indications of bad character: is it not precisely the 
point that only paranoid emperors like Caligula and Domitian would see allusions to 
themselves that are not really there in these texts? Pernot’s answer, that it is the emperors’ 
excessive response (exile, in one case, and the death penalty in the other) that is at fault, 
while their reading of the rhetoric is sound, is not totally convincing. Pernot’s third 
example is the case of Lollianus that we have already considered: this is surely his 
strongest case, especially in light of the verbal parallels between declamation and life that 
he identifies in the text of Philostratus. Pernot’s fourth example, however, does not 
concern a declamation, but rather involves Demosthenes’ Contra Leptinem being used to 
refer to contemporary life (VS 601): this can only be considered suggestive. The final 
example Pernot cites is found in Aristides’ first declamation on the Sicilian expedition, 
in which the speaker argues that enlargement will actually strengthen Athens’ empire, as 
the different subject peoples will fear one another, like slaves in a large household 
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We start with Polemo, given his self-referential technique in his extant 
declamations.50 Philostratus records three declamations delivered by this sophist that 
centred around prosangelia, a case in which, as we said above, the speaker seeks 
permission to die (VS 542–3):51 given the use that Polemo makes of his illness in his 
                                                 
(Aristid. Or. 5.39). Pernot hears in this passage an unflattering reference to the Roman 
empire and to the classic imperial tactic of divide-and-rule. Is this credible? At the point 
at which this remark comes, the audience has just been through thirty-eight chapters of 
dense Aristidean argumentation: is such a brief reference really enough to trigger a jump 
to the present day? Even Pernot sounds a little unsure, conceding that ‘nulla obblighi a 
riferire tale ragionamento alla situazione contemporanea’ (228). 
50 Civiletti (2002) 493 says, apropos of a declamation of Polemo, that the ‘glorioso 
passato classico’ ‘non mancava certo di caratteri ed episodi da prendere a modello di un’ 
esistenza continuamente in bilico tra realtà e finzione libresca’. 
51 ‘Xenophon resolved to die after Socrates’ death… Demosthenes bringing himself to 
trial after Chaeronea, and Demosthenes pretending to consider himself deserving of the 
death penalty after the Harpalus affair’ (ὁ Ξενοφῶν ὁ ἀξιῶν ἀποθνήσκειν ἐπὶ Σωκράτει… 
ὁ μετὰ Χαιρώνειαν προσάγων ἑαυτὸν καὶ ὁ δοκῶν θανάτου ἑαυτῷ τιμᾶσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς 
Ἁρπαλείοις). The third Demosthenic declamation that Philostratus mentions, 
‘Demosthenes advising the Athenians to flee on their triremes as Philip approaches’ (ὁ 
ξυμβουλεύων ἐπὶ τῶν τριῆρων φεύγειν ἐπιόντος μὲν Φιλίππου) is also close to a 
prosangelia, for such a proposal would have incurred the death penalty, ‘Aeschines 
having ratified a law that anyone who made mention of the war should be killed’ (νόμον 
δὲ Αἰσχίνου κεκυρωκότος ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν πολέμου μνημονεύσαντα). 
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extant declamations on Marathon, it seems quite possible that these prosangeliai also 
made capital out of his illness or coming death. Furthermore, given that Polemo could 
make reference to his illness in declamation, it is likely that he could have made reference 
to other aspects of his life: indeed, it was probably hard to avoid self-reference in his 
‘Demosthenes swearing that he had not received a bribe of fifty talents’ (Δημοσθένης 
ἐξομνύμενος ταλάντων πεντήκοντα δωροδοκίαν, VS 538), given that he is attacked for 
venality in contemporary epigram, and recorded as having been accused of embezzling 
the greater part of quarter of a million drachmae (VS 533).52 
 Similarly suggestive alignments can be found in Aristides. In his Concerning a 
Remark in Passing (Περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγματος, Or. 28), Aristides lists four characters from 
classical history that he has played in his declamations:53 Demosthenes, Miltiades, 
Themistocles, and Aristides the Just, the famously upright Athenian politician of the fifth 
century BC (28.6). The first three names are unsurprising: Demosthenes features in 
countless declamation scenarios, and Miltiades and Themistocles are not uncommon.54 
                                                 
52 On the parallel, see Anderson (1986) 34. On venality, see Ammianus of Smyrna, Greek 
Anthology 11.180–1 and Civiletti (2002) 493.  
53 The term he uses is ὑποκρίνομαι: strictly, this verb does not necessarily refer solely to 
declamations, but might also include prosōpopoeiai.  
54 Miltiades: Aps. Rh. 299.15–300.3 (= 301.12–16, 310.9–16, 323.9–12); RG 4.720.1–3 
(= Syrian. In Hermog. II.165.4–6), RG 5.76.1–2. Themistocles: Libanius Decl. 9–10; 
Himerius Or. 5; Apsines Rh. 220.16–19, 305.13–18 (= 323.10–12); [Hermog.] Inv. 3.5 (= 
Syrian. In Hermog. II.42.18–19; RG 4.185.20–5, 7.165.3–7); RG 4.102.4–15 (= 
4.122.27–123.2, 5.44.14–22, 7.24.21–25; Prolegomenōn Syllogē 211.24–212.1), RG 
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But Aristides the Just is almost unheard of as a character in declamation: he features once 
in Hermogenes’ De statibus, and once in the somewhat obscure prolegomena to this work, 
in both cases in scenarios that are said to be implausible, for they involve accusing this 
proverbially just character of theft.55 So it is striking that Aelius Aristides mentions 
declamations he has delivered as Aristides the Just, especially in a list of characters that 
are meant to exemplify his declamatory activity. Given the examples of self-reference in 
declamation we have seen so far, we might well wonder whether Aelius Aristides ever 
exploited the homonymy between himself and his fictitious subject in such declamations: 
he does after all explicitly draw attention to their shared name, referring to Aristides the 
Just as ‘homonymous’ (ὁμώνυμον).  
But the possibility that Aelius Aristides made reference to himself through the 
character of Aristides the Just becomes a probability when we consider the use that he 
makes of his namesake elsewhere in his oeuvre. In his On the Four (ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, 
Or. 3), he makes an explicit comparison between himself and his fifth-century namesake 
(described as ὁμώνυμον again), arguing that his pursuit of oratory is even purer than that 
of the fifth-century Athenian politician, as he refuses fees or the sportulae of patrons 
(3.99). Meanwhile in his To Plato: In Defence of Oratory (πρὸς Πλάτωνα ὑπὲρ 
Ῥητορικῆς, Or. 2), in defending his own profession of oratory, he cites Aristides the Just 
                                                 
4.122.7–9, 4.567.10–12 (= Syrian. In Hermog. II.121.24–122.1), RG 5.44.11–14, 
5.75.14–15, 8.389.17–18; Syrian. In Hermog. II.163.9–11.  
55 Hermog. Stat. I.18.2–3; Prolegomenōn Syllogē 208.16–18. Another reason for 
Aristides the Just’s absence from declamation is probably the poverty of the historical 
tradition, which is largely limited to Plutarch’s rather thin Life of Aristides. 
 
30 
 
 
as a clear example of an obviously good orator (2.346–61); the homonymy is obviously 
meant to be suggestive. So given the use that Aelius Aristides makes of Aristides the Just 
to talk about himself in his non-declamatory speeches, what more natural explanation for 
his extremely unusual declamations on this figure than that these too exploited the 
homonymy? A second such case in Aristides concerns his lost declamation Against 
Leptines (Or. 4.3). Given Aristides’ well-publicised fight for exemption from liturgies,56 
it would be very natural to hear in Demosthenes’ defence of exemptions an echo of 
Aristides’ own position; indeed, we know from Philostratus of an instance of 
Demosthenes’ own Contra Leptinem being used to refer to real life exemptions (VS 601). 
In addition to these further second- and third-century Greek examples, there are a 
number of further suggestive cases in Latin declamation and in later Greek declamation. 
When Porcius Latro was declaiming before Augustus about adopting a grandchild born 
of a prostitute (Controv. 2.4), the statement ‘that man is now by adoption being raised 
from the depths and inserted into the nobility’ (iam iste ex imo per adoptionem nobilitati 
inseritur, 2.4.13) was heard by some as a reference to Augustus’ adoption of the humble 
Agrippa’s grandsons.57 The most commonly alleged case in later Greek declamation is 
that of Libanius Decl. 1, where the figure of Socrates is said to stand for the emperor 
Julian.58 Other possible examples are to be found in the declamations of the sixth-century 
                                                 
56 See Boulanger (1923) 137–43, Behr (1968) 61–86 passim, and Bowersock (1969) 36–
40. 
57 On this episode, see Gunderson (2003) 90–114, esp. 101–4. Further possible Latin 
examples are discussed by Pernot (2007) 219–22. 
58 On this debate, see Penella (2009) 125. 
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Gazan orator Choricius. The prolaliai and theoriai that were prefaced to these works often 
foreground similarities between the declaimer and his subject (e.g. chapter 5 of the 
Theoria to Decl. 12, chapter 6 of the Theoria to Decl. 5), and Decl. 12, in which Choricius 
plays the part of an orator and which ends with the fictitious orator asking as a reward for 
his public service that ‘your sons attend my school’ (τοὺς ὑμετέρους υἱεῖς εἰς ἐμὴν 
φοιτῆσαι παλαίστραν, 12.116), practically cries out to be read self-referentially.59 
 
Conclusions 
We have numerous instances of declamations being used to make clear and in some cases 
fairly detailed reference to the world outside their fictions, most often to the declaimer 
himself and his immediate performance context. We are now in a position to draw some 
provisional conclusions about this phenomenon. 
(i) First, we now have some idea of the specific techniques used to effect such 
external reference. The use of metaphor is clear. In the scenario proposed by 
Hippodromus to Megistias, the literal magicians of the declamation stand for 
metaphorical ‘magicians’, viz. the two orators. When Aristides is given a scenario about 
a more literal, political hemegony (ἡγεμονίας, as he sees it: the word does not occur in 
the title itself), he detects a parallel with his more metaphorical ‘hegemony’ in the sphere 
of rhetoric. And in Polemo’s Marathonian declamations, Cynegirus’ literal loss of hands 
corresponds to Polemo’s metaphorical loss of hands. Puns may also play a role in at least 
                                                 
59 The survival of this practice of declamatory self-reference would be a further argument 
against the notion of a distinct ‘Third Sophistic’ in the centuries after the military, 
political, and economic troubles of the third century. For this debate, see Van Hoof 
(2010). 
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one case, if Megistias is figured as a μάγος (‘mag-ician’; cf. n. 34). In Polemo’s 
declamations, the chance to examine a whole text suggests further techniques that might 
be paralleled if we had more declamations preserved in full: the use of words whose 
meaning is dependent on context, such as pronouns, and the use of body language to 
clinch an identification. 
(ii) Why talk about oneself through the medium of declamation rather than 
openly? Pernot’s preferred model for external reference in declamation is figured speech. 
A figured speech is one that has a covert rhetorical purpose supplementary to (or even 
contradicting) its ostensible purpose, or to put it more simply, one that says one thing and 
means another.60 Pernot focuses on the first of the traditional reasons for resorting to 
figured speech – safety: figured speech allows one to say indirectly something that it 
would be too dangerous to have said openly. But in our examples, safety can hardly be 
considered to be at issue. None of those who suggest declamation titles that figure some 
aspect of the performance context—neither Asclepius nor the emperor Caracalla nor the 
sophist Megistias nor Alexander Clay-Plato’s audience—have anything to fear: on the 
                                                 
60 Pernot (2007) 213–14. Strictly, a figured declamation would say one thing to make 
another understood within the world of the fiction: a declamation that makes reference to 
the world outside the fiction is obviously not ‘figured’ in this literal sense. What Pernot 
is describing is rather figured declamation in a metaphorical sense: declamations that say 
one thing within the world of the fiction to make another thing understood in the real 
world. For general accounts of figured speech, see Demetr. Eloc. 287–295, [D.H.] Rh. 8–
9, Quint. 9.2.65–99, Aps. Rh. 330–39, [Hermog.] Inv. 4.13, Pernot (2008), and Schouler 
(1986). 
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contrary, in each case it is they that are in the more powerful position. A concern not for 
literal safety, however, but rather for a broader, ‘social’ safety does seem to be operative 
in some of our examples; this is quite similar, indeed, to a second traditional goal of 
figured speech, that of propriety.61 Whenever one makes bold claims about oneself (as 
several of our declaimers do), one runs the risk that those claims will be contested and 
rejected by others, and the evidence of Philostratus suggests that any such public 
humiliation would be long remembered. Lucian too in his De historia conscribenda is 
very harsh on a contemporary historian’s aspirations to be a second Thucydides (15);62 
the propriety of self-praise, too, was much discussed in this period, forming the subject 
of treatments by Plutarch and Aristides himself.63 If failure occurs in a fictional realm, 
however, there is the possibility of denying the claim. In the face of Hippodromus’ 
provocative intrusion on his lesson, Megistias uses a declamation title to suggest his great 
superiority over the newcomer: but when Hippodromus turns out to be a skilled 
declaimer, there is no direct proof of what Megistias had tried to do. Similarly, in the 
rather charged encounter between Herodes Atticus and Alexander Clay-Plato, the 
                                                 
61 The sort of impropriety that figured speech is designed to circumvent, however, is much 
stronger than a bit of boasting: in [Hermog.] Inv., for example, it is employed to avoid 
having openly to accuse one’s father of incest. 
62 The Vitae sophistarum include Herodes’ failure before Marcus (VS 565) and Philagrus’ 
sham extemporizing (VS 579–80); Lucian too claims to have caught a declaimer 
attempting precisely the same ruse, and that using plagiarised material (Pseudol. 5). 
63 Plutarch On Praising Oneself Inoffensively (περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν ἀνεπιφθόνως); 
Aristides’ Concerning a Remark in Passing (περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγματος, Or. 28). See 
Rutherford (1995) and Pernot (1998). 
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figuring of the sophists as fictional declamation characters allows them to negotiate their 
respective statuses in greater safety.  
The notions of social safety and deniability will not work for all of our examples, 
however. Aristides actually makes the equation between himself and Demosthenes 
explicit, and while Caracalla does mask his disapproval of what he seems to see as 
Heliodorus’ cowardice by figuring the sophist as a cowardly Demosthenes, the emperor’s 
aggression is so flimsily disguised that it is hardly deniable. Furthermore, Polemo’s 
identification with Cynegirus and Callimachus, while less immediately obvious, is so 
thoroughgoing that once seen it too can hardly be denied. But what this figuring as a 
famous person from the classical past does achieve is to render whatever claims are made 
about the declaimer notably more powerful. Aristides’ oratorical abilities are as great as 
those of Demosthenes; Polemo’s battle with disease is a great as the battle of Marathon; 
and Heliodorus’ hesitancy is, crushingly, as bad as Demosthenes’ failure before Philip. 
As was acknowledged above, the habit of seeing oneself in classical history is not limited 
to declamation: but declamation allows one to pursue such identifications on a grand 
scale.64 This effect has something in common with what Quintilian lists as a third goal 
that some pursue in figured speech (not present in other accounts, either in Latin or 
Greek), namely ‘elegance’ (venustas). ‘By its very freshness and variety’ (ipsa novitate 
ac varietate), Quintilian explains, ‘it gives more pleasure than if it were a straightforward 
account’ (magis quam si relatio sit recta delectat, 9.2.66). Yet Quintilian’s formulation 
suggests something a little less serious than the claim to be a second Demosthenes. To be 
able to figure the contemporary world as the classical at the drop of a hat demonstrates a 
range of sophistic virtues: learning, inventiveness, a ready tongue, even wit, particularly 
                                                 
64 Cf. n. 8 above. 
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if the identification is recondite or unusually apposite; thus the phenomenon we have been 
describing is of a piece with the attitudes on show in numerous other encounters between 
declaimers in Philostratus’ Vitae sophistarum. Self-reference through declamation, then, 
can be used to achieve a range of sophisticated ends. 
  (iii) Reference to the world outside its own fiction, then, and in particular to its 
author and its immediate performance context, emerges as a significant, previously 
underappreciated function of Greek declamation, used for talking about oneself and one’s 
circumstances in a powerful, eloquent, and yet also deniable way. This discovery is 
important not just for reading declamations and sophistic culture in the second and third 
centuries, but also for the numerous occasions on which declamatory material is found in 
other genres of this period, as well as for the later Greek declaimers Libanius, Himerius 
and Choricius, and for Latin declamation.65 
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